Abstract-We investigate the physical layer (PHY) security of a system with a base-station (BS), a legitimate user, and an eavesdropper, whose exact location is unknown but within a ring-shaped area around the BS. To this end, we present novel closed-form expressions for the secrecy outage probability, which take into consideration both the impact of fading, as well as the eavesdropper's location uncertainty. The derived expressions are validated through simulations, which reveal that the level of uncertainty should be seriously taken into account in the design and deployment of a wireless system with PHY security.
Physical Layer Security With Uncertainty on the Location of the Eavesdropper I. INTRODUCTION P HYSICAL layer (PHY) security has received significant attention in the last years, since it can provide reliable and secure communication by employing the fundamental characteristics of the transmission medium, such as multipath fading [1] . Until recently, the locations of the legitimate user and the eavesdropper were assumed to be known to the base-station (BS) (see [2] [3] [4] and references therein).
However, this assumption was questioned in [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] , since in the case of a purely passive eavesdropper, its location is not realistic to be known to the BS [5] . Specifically, in [5] , the probability for non-zero secrecy capacity was derived, assuming that the eavesdroppers were scattered according to a Poisson point process (PPP), while the BS has available instantaneous channel state information (CSI) of the legitimate user. In [6] , the secrecy outage probability (SOP) was evaluated for a scenario where multiple colluding eavesdroppers are distributed according to a PPP, but the effect of multipath fading was not taken into consideration, and the derived expressions are not generally in closed-form. In [7] , multiple BSs distrubuted according to a PPP are considered, but the authors assume full or partial knowledge of the location of the potential eavesdroppers. Also, the effect of fading was not taken into consideration, and the achievable secret transmission rate is presented in the form of bounds and approximations. In [8] , the impact of uncertainty on Eve's location is investigated, but the CSI of the main channel is known to Alice, and the expression for the SOP is not closed-form, but it is given in a form of an infinite series. In [9] and [10] in Eve's location is handled by performing estimation with techniques, such as received signal strength, angle of arrival and time difference of arrival. In our work, we consider the case, where the hardware required for these techniques is not available to Alice. Furthermore, in [11] , the location uncertainty was modeled in terms of node and link failures by using secrecy graphs. Finally, in [12] , the authors considered a multiple BS scenario, in which the locations of the legitimate users and the eavesdroppers were assumed known, while the location of each BS was assumed unknown and modeled as a PPP.
In this work, we present closed-form expressions for the SOP, as a function of the targeted transmission rate, assuming that the eavesdropper's location is modeled as a uniform distribution over a ring-shaped area, centered at the BS's location. We also consider that the BS has available statistical CSI knowledge, for both the legitimate user and the eavesdropper. The derived expressions hold for any given path loss exponent, and they can be used in various practical scenarios to select deployment specifications, such as the targeted data rate and the minimum level of uncertainty that is required, in order to employ PHY security in a wireless system. To the best of the authors' knowledge, the impact of the uncertainty on the location of the eavesdropper in PHY security under these assumptions has not been addressed yet in the open technical literature.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the downlink scenario in a wireless network that consists of a BS, which aims to transmit a confidential message to a legitimate user, in the presence of an eavesdropper. For convenience, we refer to the BS as Alice (A), the legitimate user as Bob (B), and the eavesdropper as Eve (E). The baseband equivalent signals received by Bob and Eve can be respectively written as
where x denotes the transmitted signal, n B and n E are zero mean complex Gaussian random variables (RVs) that represent zero-mean symmetric additive white Gaussian noises (AWGN), with power spectral density N 0 at Bob and Eve, respectively. be expressed as in [13] , and is given by
where X ∈ {B, E}, while |g X | and α denote the Rayleigh fading channel gain and the path loss coefficient, respectively. We assume that the distance between Alice and Bob is constant and known to Alice, while the exact distance between Alice and Eve is unknown to Alice. Furthermore, Eve's location is uniformly distributed in a ring centered at Alice's position, with inner radius R 1 and outer radius R 2 . R 2 represents the BS's coverage region, since Eve has to be located at a position where she can reliably receive the signal transmitted by Alice. For a fixed R 2 , R 1 shows the minimum distance between Alice and Eve required to achieve a target SOP, for the design and deployment of a system with specific SOP requirements. This is a realistic assumption, when Eve is not a legitimate member of the network. In practice, R 1 represents a secure region around the BS. By using (2), the instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at Bob and Eve can be expressed as
where, E s , represents the energy of the transmitted signal.
III. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
The secrecy capacity is given by [14] 
where, C B = log 2 (γ B + 1), is the capacity of the legitimate channel between Alice and Bob, and, C E = log 2 (γ E +1), is the capacity of the eavesdropper channel between Alice and Eve. Proposition 1: The probability density function (PDF) of |h E | 2 as given by (2) can be expressed as in (5), as shown at the bottom of the next page, while the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of |h E | 2 can be obtained as
where
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A. The SOP is the probability that the secrecy capacity is lower than a target secrecy rate r s , i.e., P o (r s ) = P r (C s ≤ r s ), or equivalently
Theorem 1: The SOP can be expressed in closed-form as
where L(r s ) is a coefficient that depends on the uncertainty about the location of the eavesdropper, and is given by (9) , as shown at the bottom of the next page. Moreover, 
A. An Insightful Scenario
Next, we study the insightful scenario, when α = 2. This path loss parameter corresponds to the free-space transmission, which even though is not a realistic case for terrestrial wireless communications, it provides useful insights for the impact of the uncertainty in Eve's location on the secrecy capacity. By substituting α = 2 into (9), and applying [16, Eq. (9.121/6)], L(r s ) can be simplified as
Next, we examine the case where R 1 approaches R 2 . Consider the function l fs (R 1 ) = L fs (r s ) for a fixed r s . We observe that l fs (R 1 ) is a decreasing function. In other words, as R 1 decreases, i.e., Alice becomes more uncertain about the location of the eavesdropper, the SOP also increases. By applying L' Hospital's rule on (10), we obtain
By substituting (11) into (8), the SOP when R 1 → R 2 can be written as
Note that (12) coincides with the SOP for a fixed eavesdropper distance from Alice, considering free-space transmission [17] . This indicates that as the uncertainty on the location of the eavesdropper decreases, the performance of the system tends to the system, where the location of the eavesdropper is considered to be known to Alice. This observation is illustrated in Section IV through simulations.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We consider that Bob is located 3 m from Alice. Additionally, Alice knows that Eve is located in a ring with inner radius R 1 and outer radius R 2 . Unless otherwise stated, R 2 = 200 m. In the following figures, LU stands for location uncertainty. Fig. 1 depicts the SOP as a function of
for different values of r s , when R 1 = 50 m and α = 3. Moreover, the SOP is plotted for the case when Eve's location is known (d E = R 1 and d E = R 2 ), in order to be used as benchmark. As expected, for a fixed targeted secrecy rate, r s = 0, as the SOP increases. We also observe that, when the distance between Alice and Eve is known and equal to d E = R 1 , the SOP is higher compared to the case where Eve's location is uncertain. However, when d E = R 2 , the SOP is lower, compared to the case with location uncertainty for Eve. In other words, the cases where Eve is located at a fixed distance equal to R 1 or R 2 from Alice can be treated as an upper or a lower bound, respectively, for the SOP. These observations reveal the importance of taking into consideration the uncertainty on the location of the eavesdropper, when designing and deploying a wireless system with PHY security. = 30 dB and α = 2. Again, the SOPs when the eavesdropper locations are known (d E = R 1 and d E = R 2 ) are illustrated as benchmarks. As expected, for a given r s , as R 1 increases, the uncertainty of the Eve's received SNR decreases; hence, the SOP decreases. Also, we observe that for a fixed R 1 , higher values of r s lead to higher SOPs. As mentioned before, the cases where the distance is fixed and equal to d E = R 1 and d E = R 2 provide an upper and a lower bound, respectively, for the SOP. As R 2 − R 1 decreases, the uncertainty of Eve's location decreases, and the upper and the lower bound of the SOP converge. Fig. 3 depicts the SOP as a function of r s , for different values of α and
. We observe that, for fixed α and E s N 0 , as r s increases, the SOP increases. This is expected since, as indicated by (7), the instantaneous capacity difference between C B and C E is statistically less likely to achieve for higher values of r s . Also, for a fixed
and r s , as α increases, the impact of path loss becomes more severe; therefore, the SOP increases. Moreover, for a fixed α and r s , higher values of Since Eve's location is uniformly distributed as described in Section II, the CDF of |h E | 2 can be evaluated as [13, Eq. (3) ]
where F |g E | 2 (x) denotes the CDF of |g E | 2 , which, since |g E | 2 is an exponentially distributed RV, is given by
By substituting (14) into (13), we get
By setting y = z 2 into the integral in (15) and then by applying [16, Eq. 2.33/4], we get (6). The PDF of |h E | 2 can be obtained as
By using (16) in (6), we get (5). This concludes the proof.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The SOP can be expressed as
where X = γ B + 1 and Y = γ E + 1.
Since |h B | is a Rayleigh distributed RV, it follows that |h X | 2 is an exponentially distributed RV. Taking into consideration (2), the CDF of the SNR at Bob is given by
Consequently, the CDF of X can be derived as F X (x) = F γ B (x − 1), or
On the other hand, the SNR of the eavesdropper is a RV that follows a distribution described in Proposition 1. Therefore, by using (15) and (16) , the PDF of Y can be expressed as
Furthermore, since X and Y are independent RVs, by taking into consideration (17) , the SOP can be obtained as
By substituting (19) and (20) 
Finally, we carry out the integration in (23) by using [16, Eq. (9. 111)], and after some mathematical manipulations, we get (8) . This concludes the proof.
